Nova Publishers
My Account Nova Publishers Shopping Cart
HomeBooksSeriesJournalsReference CollectionseBooksInformationSalesImprintsFor Authors
            
  Top » Catalog » Books » Environment » Environmental Cost Management Chapters » My Account  |  Cart Contents  |  Checkout   
Quick Find
  
Use keywords to find the product you are looking for.
Advanced Search
What's New? more
Gas Separation: Techniques, Applications and Effects
$82.00
Shopping Cart more
0 items
Information
Shipping & Returns
Privacy Notice
Conditions of Use
Contact Us
Notifications more
NotificationsNotify me of updates to A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR AT THE CORPORATE AND GLOBAL LEVEL pp. 167-202
Tell A Friend
 
Tell someone you know about this product.
A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR AT THE CORPORATE AND GLOBAL LEVEL pp. 167-202 $0.00
Authors:  Richard Fairchild and Baris Yalabik, School of Management, University of Bath, UK
Abstract:
With our planet’s environment facing increasing threat of irreparable damage,
academics, practitioners, and policy-makers are becoming more focused on the incentives
of individuals, corporations, and governments to act in the interests of the environment.
Since the environment is a public good, private incentives may be misaligned. Hence,
game theory provides an ideal tool to examine environmental problems.
In this paper, we review the existing game-theoretic approach to the environmental
behaviour of corporations and governments. The literature reveals that, at the corporate
level, environmental incentives are driven by market forces (the existence of ‘green’
consumers and investors), and regulation. Hence, game-theoretic approaches within the
industrial organisation field are particularly appropriate. At the global level, where
governments make international environmental agreements (IEAs), the situation
resembles a prisoner’s dilemma, where each nation is tempted to break the IEA, and
‘free-ride’ on the other nations’ abatement efforts.
After reviewing the literature, we make our own contributions, at both the corporate
and global levels. At the corporate level, we develop a benchmark monopoly model of
corporate environmental behaviour. We then compare our results with those of
Fairchild’s (2008) duopoly model, and Bagnoli and Watts (2003) oligopoly model. This
provides an insight into the inter-relationship between market structure, consumers’
environmental preferences, and corporate environmental behaviour.
Next, we develop a behavioural game theoretic approach to global environmental
agreements, in order to determine whether psychological factors, such as empathy, guilt
and anger, can mitigate governmental free-riding, and sustain IEAs. 


Available Options:
Version:

  Open Access item.
  Click below PDF icon for free download.

  

This is an Open Access item. Click above PDF icon for free download.
Special Focus Titles
01.Violent Communication and Bullying in Early Childhood Education
02.The New Science of Curiosity
03.Cultural Considerations in Intervention with Women and Children Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence
04.Chronic Disease and Disability: The Pediatric Lung
05.Fruit and Vegetable Consumption and Health: New Research
06.Future Perspectives on Nigella sativa: Characterization and Pharmacological Properties
07.Wine and Winemaking: The Value and Efficiency
08.Impacts and Challenges in Oil Palm Cultivation and Downstream Applications of Biomass
09.Fire and the Sword: Understanding the Impact and Challenge of Organized Islamism. Volume 2
10.The Life and Times of the World's Most Famous Mathematicians
11.Innovation Processes in the Social Space of the Organization
12.High-Strength Steels: New Trends in Production and Applications

Nova Science Publishers
© Copyright 2004 - 2018

A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR AT THE CORPORATE AND GLOBAL LEVEL pp. 167-202