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Manipulation Effect of Managerial Discretion on Managerial Compensation: Evidence from Listed Firms in China
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Authors: Zhang Changzheng (Qujiang Campus of Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an, China) 
Book Description:
Recently, scholars and practitioners have focused on the inverse relationship between managerial payment and corporate performance, which shows how the principle-agent theory cannot adequately explain the decision mechanism of managerial payment. Based on the Managerial Power Approach, the book brings managerial discretion into the investigation on managerial pay. The book makes contributions such as: it constructs measurement index system of managerial discretion based on public reports. The classical ERIC questionnaire measures managerial discretion directly from CEO's by 63 items, while the book divides managerial discretion into resource cooperation power, structure-position power and expertise-reputation power, and then measures them by public report. The two methods have the similar results, and this method has has the advantage of being low cost, and easily carried out. It confirms that managerial discretion can manipulate the managerial pay level by the regression analysis of managerial discretion and managerial pay level. It also confirms that the pay level goes beyond the reasonable level too much with the accretion of managerial discretion, which shows that the manipulation effect on pay level does exist. then the book describes the manipulation effect quantitatively. By curve estimation of monitoring intensity effect on manipulation effect, it also gives other relationship curves between them, which shows that the manipulation effect decreases significantly with the accretion of managerial discretion. The book constructs pay performance sensitivity model based managerial discretion. Based on Saltuk Model,the book brings managerial discretion and proves that managerial discretion and pay-performance sensitivity are negatively associated. Then the book confirms that pay performance sensitivity will decrease with an increase of managerial discretion by regressional analysis.

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Table of Contents:
PREFACE

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION, pp. 1-34
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM POSING
1.1.1 Research background
1.1.2 Problem posing
1.2 REVIEW ON THE STUDY OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND CEO COMPENSATION
1.2.1 Concepts definition
1.2.2 Summarization on research of managerial discretion in corporate governance
1.2.3 Summarization on research of CEO compensation
1.2.4 Summarization on the research of CEO compensation with managerial discretion approach
1.2.5 The limitations of extant research
1.3 RESEARCH CONTENTS AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
1.3.1 Research contents
1.3.2 Research framework
1.3.3 Research meaning and objective
1.4 RESEARCH IDEAS AND BOOK SCHEDULE
1.4.1 Research ideas
1.4.2 Book schedule
1.5 SUMMARIZATION

CHAPTER 2. MEASUREMENT OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND MONITORING INTENSITY, pp. 35-76
2.1 EFFECT OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IS UP TO MONITORING INTENSITY
2.1.1 Absence of monitoring is the sticking point during the reform of the state-owned enterprises in China 37
2.1.2 Validity of the power allocation system inside the corporation is co-determined by managerial discretion and monitoring intensity
2.1.3 There is significant difference in corporate governance between the western countries and China
2.2 MEASUREMENT OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
2.2.1 The concept of managerial discretion in corporate governance
2.2.2 Review on the measurement methods of managerial discretion
2.2.3 Sources and dimensions of managerial discretion
2.2.4 Measurement variable definition of managerial discretion
2.3 CHOICE OF MONITORING INTENSITY MEASUREMENT METHOD
2.3.1 Lack of external monitoring
2.3.2 Composition of internal monitoring
2.3.3 The choice of indicators measuring shareholders monitoring intensity
2.3.4 Choice of indicators measuring the board of directors monitoring intensity
2.4 TESTING OF MEASUREMENT INDICES SYSTEM OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
2.4.1 Sample selection and data description
2.4.2 Exploratory factor analysis of managerial discretion
2.4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of managerial discretion
2.4.4 Results comparison with Eric questionnaire
2.5 TESTING OF MEASUREMENT INDICES SYSTEM OF MONITORING INTENSITY
2.5.1 Sample selection and data description
2.5.2 Test results
2.5.3 Test on the relationship among managerial discretion, monitoring intensity and firm performance
2.6 SUMMARIZATION OF CHAPTER II

CHAPTER 3. MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, CEO PAY LEVEL AND FIRM PERFORMANCE, pp. 77-110
3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ON CEO PAY LEVEL AND ITS EFFECT ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
3.1.1 Empirical study on the determining factors of CEO pay level
3.1.2 Literature on improvement effect of CEO pay level on firm performance
3.1.3 Literature comment and Research question
3.2 HYPOTHESES
3.2.1 Hypotheses on the manipulation effect of managerial discretion on CEO pay level
3.2.2 Hypotheses on the relationship among managerial discretion, CEO pay level and firm performance
3.3 VARIABLES DESIGN AND SAMPLE DATA
3.3.1 Variables Design
3.3.2 Sample Data
3.4 TEST RESULTS
3.4.1 Test of H3-1
3.4.2 Test of H3-1a
3.4.3 Test of H3-1b
3.4.4 Test of H3-2
3.4.5 Robustness test
3.5 DISCUSSION: MONITORING INTENSITY AND MANIPULATION EFFECT ON CEO PAY LEVEL
3.6 SUMMARIZATION OF CHAPTER III

CHAPTER 4. MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, CEO PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE, pp. 111-146
4.1 LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROBLEM CLARIFICATION
4.1.1 Review on study on the determining factors of CEO pay-performance sensitivity
4.1.2 Review on the study on the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on firm performance
4.1.3 Literature comment and chapter outline
4.2 MODEL ON CEO PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY BASED ON MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
4.2.1 Model Assumptions
4.2.2 Model Analysis
4.3 HYPOTHESES
4.3.1 Hypothesis on the relationship between managerial discretion and pay-performance sensitivity of CEO
4.3.2 Hypothesis on the relationship among managerial discretion, CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm performance
4.4 EMPIRICAL METHOD DESIGN
4.4.1 Empirical model construction
4.4.2 Variable definition
4.4.3 Sample and data
4.4.4 The estimation of CEO pay-performance sensitivity for Chinese listed firms
4.5 HYPOTHESES TESTS
4.5.1 Test of H4-1
4.5.2 Tests of H4-1a, H4-1-b, H4-1c, H4-1d
4.5.3 Test of H4-2
4.5.4 Robustness test
4.6 SUMMARIZATION OF CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER 5. MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, MANAGERIAL PAY GAP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE, pp. 147-182
5.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ON DETERMINING FACTORS OF MANAGERIAL PAY GAP AND ITS EFFECT ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
5.1.1 Literatures on the determining factors of managerial pay gap
5.1.2 Literatures on the effect of managerial pay gap on firm performance
5.1.3 Research questions and chapter outline
5.2 MODEL ON CEO PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY BASED ON MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
5.2.1 Model assumptions
5.2.2 Model design
5.2.3 Model analysis
5.3 HYPOTHESES 150
5.3.1 Effect of managerial discretion on managerial pay gap
5.3.2 Effect of managerial discretion on firm performance
5.3.3 Moderating effect of managerial pay gap on relationship between managerial discretion and firm performance
5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.4.1 Variables definition
5.4.2 Sample and data
5.4.3 Test of H5-1
5.4.4 Test of H5-1a
5.4.5 Tests of H5-2 and H5-2a
5.4.6 Robustness test
5.5 RESULTS DISCUSSION
5.5.1 The inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial discretion and managerial pay gap managerial pay
5.6 SUMMARIZATION OF CHAPTER V

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH PROSPECTS, pp. 183-203
6.1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS
6.2 RESEARCH PROSPECTS
REFERENCES
APPENDIX I. ERIC QUESTIONNAIRE ON MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 190

Index

   Series:
      Management Science - Theory and Applications
   Binding: Hardcover
   Pub. Date: 2011
   Pages: 7x10
   ISBN: 978-1-60876-460-0
   Status: AV
  
Status Code Description
AN Announcing
FM Formatting
PP Page Proofs
FP Final Production
EP Editorial Production
PR At Prepress
AP At Press
AV Available
  
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Manipulation Effect of Managerial Discretion on Managerial Compensation: Evidence from Listed Firms in China